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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
The state appeals from the district court’s order granting Daily’s motion to 
suppress evidence recovered during a traffic stop, and from the district court’s denial of 
the state’s motion for reconsideration.  
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
 
In May 2016 Nez Perce County Deputy Sheriff Lucas Martin observed a pickup 
truck fail to stop at a stop sign and fail to signal when turning at an intersection.  (Tr., p.8, 
Ls.6-13; p.12, L.12 – p.13, L.8.)  Deputy Martin effectuated a traffic stop, approached the 
pickup truck, and identified the driver as Jordan Daily.  (Tr., p.13, L.16 – p.15, L.5.)  
Deputy Martin observed Daily look for his relevant vehicle documents in the glove box.  
(Tr., p.16, Ls.15-19.) 
As he was talking to Daily at the truck, Deputy Martin observed what appeared to 
be an open can of an alcoholic beverage in the front seat console cup holder of the 
vehicle.  (Tr., p.15, L.14 – p.16, L.10.)  Deputy Martin returned to his patrol vehicle to 
run a license and warrants check on Daily.  (Tr., p.17, Ls.7-22.)  Dispatch informed 
Deputy Martin that Daily had a confirmed arrest warrant for failing to appear, and that his 
driver’s license was suspended.  (Tr., p.17, L.23 – p.18, L.13.)  While these checks were 
being conducted, Deputy Martin observed Daily moving inside the truck, reaching over 
towards the passenger side of the front seat, and putting something in the back seat.  (Tr., 
p.18, L.14 – p.19, L.4; p.20, L.17 – p.21, L.5.)  Deputy Martin requested that another 
officer be called to the scene.  (Tr., p.19, L.12 – p.20, L.3.) 
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When the other officer arrived, Deputy Martin arrested Daily on the warrant and 
secured him in his patrol vehicle.  (Tr., p.21, Ls.6-22.)  Deputy Martin returned to Daily’s 
truck, took the can from the center console, and observed that it was open, smelled like 
alcohol, and was cold to the touch.  (Tr., p.21, L.23 – p.23, L.8; p.24, Ls.10-12.)  Deputy 
Martin then began a search of the truck for any other open containers of alcohol, and 
found several empty or near-empty alcohol containers in the back seat area.  (Tr., p.23, 
L.9 – p.24, L.22.)   
Because he had previously found open containers of alcohol in glove boxes, 
Deputy Martin searched Daily’s truck’s glove box.  (Tr., p.25, Ls.2-12.)  Even though 
Deputy Martin had, earlier in the traffic stop, observed Daily search for documents in the 
glove box, the glove box was now locked.  (Tr., p.25, Ls.13-15.)   Deputy Martin 
unlocked the glove box with Daily’s keys and discovered a needle syringe containing a 
“cloudy clear” substance that Deputy Martin believed to be methamphetamine.  (Tr., 
p.25, L.16 – p.26, L.6.)  Deputy Martin also recovered, from the glove box, several small 
baggies of a powdery substance that Deputy Martin believed to be methamphetamine, a 
digital scale, and other drug paraphernalia.  (Tr., p.26, L.15 – p.28, L.18.)  Deputy Martin 
advised Daily of his Miranda rights, and Daily told him that he was a drug addict and that 
everything in the vehicle was his.  (Tr., p.28, L.25 – p.29, L.8.)  The state charged Daily 
with felony possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and misdemeanor 
possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp.58-59.) 
Daily filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle and all 
statements made following the search.  (R., pp.65-72.)  Daily argued that while the 
officers had lawful authority to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle after 
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discovering the open alcohol container in plain view, the search of the locked glove box 
was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment.  (Id.) 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the state presented testimony from 
Deputy Martin and the dash cam video from the traffic stop.  (Tr., p.7, Ls.14-20; p.7, L.23 
– p.42, L.14; p.57, Ls.5-13; State’s Exhibit 1.)  At the conclusion of the hearing, the state 
argued that the search of the glove box was justified by the automobile exception and 
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.  (Tr., p.43, L.1 – p.47, 
L.10.)   
In a written order, the district court granted Daily’s motion to suppress.  (R., 
pp.86-91.)  The court concluded: (1) that Deputy Martin lacked probable cause to search 
the glove box and that the search was therefore not justified by the automobile exception 
to the warrant requirement; and (2) the search incident to arrest exception was 
inapplicable to the case pursuant to Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), because Daily 
was secured in the back of the patrol car and was no longer able to access his vehicle 
when the search took place.  (R., pp.88-90.)  The court also denied the state’s subsequent 
motion for reconsideration.  (R., pp.94-101, 122-125.)  While the district court’s order on 
the motion for reconsideration was pending, the state filed a notice of appeal that was 




                                            
1 The state’s motion for reconsideration did not extend the time to file an appeal because 
it was not filed within 14 days of the order granting Daily’s motion to suppress.  I.A.R. 
14(a).  However, the notice of appeal was timely filed within 42 days of the district 





Did the district court err by granting Daily’s motion to suppress and by denying 






The District Court Erred By Granting Daily’s Motion To Suppress And By Denying The 
State’s Motion For Reconsideration 
 
A.  Introduction 
The district court granted Daily’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a 
traffic stop.  (R., pp.86-91.)  Specifically, the court concluded that the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the officers’ search of the glove box 
in Daily’s vehicle.2  (R., pp.88-89.)  A review of the record and applicable law reveals 
that the district court erred by applying an erroneous legal standard.  Specifically, the 
district court erred in concluding that the state was required to demonstrate separate 
probable cause to search the glove box even after Deputy Martin already located 
contraband in plain view during the traffic stop.  Pursuant to the correct legal standard, 
Deputy Martin’s lawful discovery of the open container permitted the officers to search 
any portion of the vehicle where additional contraband may reasonably be found, 
including the glove box.    
 
B.  Standard Of Review 
 
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are 
supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional 
principles to the facts as found.”  State v. Colvin, 157 Idaho 881, 882, 341 P.3d 598, 
599 (Ct. App. 2014).   
 
                                            
2 The state does not challenge the district court’s conclusion regarding the inapplicability, 
in this case, of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.  
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C. The District Court Erred By Granting Daily’s Motion To Suppress 
 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.  “A 
warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain special and 
well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.”  State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 
873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 
454-55 (1971); see also State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 
1999)).  One such exception is the “automobile exception,” which authorizes a 
warrantless search of a vehicle and the containers therein when there is probable cause to 
believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity.  California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982); 
State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842, 979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999); State v. Yeoumans, 144 
Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 
281, 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 2005).  “Probable cause is established if the facts 
available to the officer at the time of the search would warrant a person of reasonable 
caution in the belief that the area or items to be searched contained contraband or 
evidence of a crime.”  Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172 P.3d at 1148 (citing Ross, 456 
U.S. at 823). 
When an officer observes contraband in plain view inside a vehicle, the officer is 
justified under the automobile exception in searching the vehicle for additional 
contraband, as long as the scope of the search is limited to “only those places where such 
contraband might reasonably be found.”  State v. Anderson, No. 41730, 2015 WL 
7204541, at *2 (Idaho Ct. App. November 17, 2015); see also State v. Gallegos, 120 




distinction between probable cause to believe that contraband is somewhere in a vehicle 
and probable cause to believe that contraband is located in a particular container in the 
vehicle, and holding that the officer lawfully searched a container found underneath the 
spare tire after a drug dog alerted on the vehicle); Gibson, 141 Idaho at 281, 108 P.3d at 
428 (“If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully-stopped vehicle, it justifies the 
search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the 
search.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-825 (1982) 
(“[w]hen a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its limits have been 
precisely defined, nice distinctions between ... glove compartments, upholstered seats, 
trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give way to the interest in 
the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand.”).  Therefore, an officer is not 
required, under the Fourth Amendment,3 to establish separate probable cause to search 
any particular portion of a vehicle after contraband has already been lawfully located in 
the same vehicle.  Instead, once it is established that a vehicle contains contraband, an 
officer may search any portion of the vehicle, including the containers within, where 
“such contraband might reasonably be found” or which “may conceal the object of the 
search.”   
In Anderson, an officer stopped a vehicle for a driving infraction.  Anderson, 
2015 WL 7204541 at *1.  The officer observed a brown paper bag located near the center 
console, and Anderson admitted to the officer that the bag contained an open container of 
alcohol.  Id.  The officer then searched the vehicle and found controlled substances near 
                                            
3 Daily did not argue, and the district court did not conclude, that the Idaho Constitution 
provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in contexts applicable to this 




the center console and on the floor between the door and the seat on the driver’s side.  Id.  
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the search was lawful under the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement, holding the officer “was not obligated to forego or 
stop a search because he had already found some evidence of wrongdoing,” and that 
“seeing the contraband in plain view is sufficient to create probable cause to search for 
additional contraband.”  Id. at *2-3. 
While the United States Supreme Court has cautioned about the limits of the 
automobile exception and that, for example, “probable cause to believe that 
undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search 
of a suitcase,” Ross, 456 U.S. at 824, numerous jurisdictions have held that, where 
officers observe or lawfully seize an open container in a vehicle, the automobile 
exception permits a search of the rest of the passenger compartment of the vehicle.  See, 
e.g. United States v. McGuire, 957 F.2d 310, 314 (7th Cir. 1992) (after discovering that 
motorist was transporting open container of alcohol in violation of Illinois law, officer 
was authorized under the automobile exception in “search[ing] every part of the vehicle 
and its contents that could conceal additional contraband, including the area beneath the 
passenger seat and the trunk”); United States v. Smith, 2014 WL 116368, *5 (M.D. Ala. 
2014) (search of vehicle justified under automobile exception where officer observed an 
open beer container in plain view in center console); People v. Hill, 929 P.2d 735, 739-
740 (Colo. 1996) (search of vehicle justified under automobile exception where 
observation of “open beer bottles in the vehicle’s center console and a partially open 
twelve-pack of beer in the vehicle’s back seat …. gave the officers probable cause to 
believe that the open alcohol container law had been violated”); State v. Collard, 414 
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N.W.2d 733, 735-736 (Minn. App. 1988) (officer justified in searching remainder of 
passenger compartment after observing open bottle of beer in plain view on floor of car 
in front of driver’s seat). 
In this case, the district court concluded that the automobile exception did not 
justify the officer’s search of the glove box.  (R., pp.88-89.)  It appears that the court’s 
conclusion was based on a determination that the state failed to demonstrate that the 
officer had probable cause to search the glove box specifically.  The court found that the 
state lacked “probable cause to search the glove box,” that “no reasonable person, based 
on these facts, would conclude that an open container would be present in the glove box,” 
and that “no magistrate, presented with these facts, would have found probable cause to 
support issuing a search warrant.”  (Id.)  The district court thus applied an incorrect legal 
standard, because, as noted above, once an officer has lawfully discovered that a vehicle 
contains contraband, he may search any portion of the vehicle where “such contraband 
might reasonably be found” or which “may conceal the object of the search.”  Anderson, 
2015 WL 7204541 at *2. 
In its order denying the state’s motion for reconsideration, the district court first 
lamented that “[t]his case takes a place in the long line of cases that begin with a law 
enforcement traffic stop for minor or innocuous reasons, but then culminates in a 
warrantless roadside search of an entire motor vehicle.”  (R., p.123 (footnote omitted).)  
However, regardless of whether a misdemeanor open container violation is, in the district 
court’s view, “minor or innocuous,” an open container of alcohol in a vehicle is, under 
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Idaho law, contraband,4 and does, for the reasons set forth above, justify a warrantless 
search of the vehicle.  The district court then concluded again that the state failed to 
provide a “factual basis” that the “mere presence” of the open container gave rise to an 
“objectively reasonable belief that the vehicle contain[ed] additional bottles of opened 
alcohol.”  (Id.)  Finally, the court appeared to analyze the officers’ subjective motives for 
the search, and concluded that “[l]ike most warrantless roadside searches of motor 
vehicles, this was one in search of whatever law enforcement could find, not something 
specific they had reasonable expectation of finding.”  (R., p.124.)  The court thus 
ultimately failed to determine the specific relevant issue of this case utilizing the correct 
legal standard, i.e., whether the glove box was a part of the vehicle where an open 
container, objectively, “might reasonably be found” or which “may conceal” an open 
container.  Anderson, 2015 WL 7204541 at *2; State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136, 922 
P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996) (“When reviewing an officer’s actions the court must judge the 
facts against an objective standard.”).   
Application of the correct legal standards, as set forth in Anderson, Gallegos, 
Gibson, and Ross, demonstrate that the officers had lawful authority under the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement to search the glove box.  Upon finding 
an open container in plain view, and other empty alcohol containers in the back seat, the 
glove box (which is easily accessible to the driver of a vehicle), became an area of the car 
where “such contraband might reasonably be found” or which “may conceal the object of 
the search.”  This is especially true in this case where Deputy Martin testified that he had 
                                            
4 Subject to certain exceptions not applicable in this case, it is a misdemeanor for a person 
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle to “possess any open beverage containing 




found open containers of alcohol in glove boxes in the past, that he observed Daily 
reaching over towards the passenger side of the truck while Deputy Martin was in his 
patrol vehicle, and the circumstantial evidence indicating that Daily locked the glove box 
during the traffic stop.  (Tr., p.16, Ls.15-19; p.18, L.14 – p.19, L.4; p.20, L.17 – p.21, L.5; 
p.25, Ls.5-15.)   
The district court erred by applying an incorrect legal standard and by granting 
Daily’s motion to suppress.  This Court should therefore vacate the district court’s orders 
granting Daily’s motion to suppress and denying the state’s motion for reconsideration.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to vacate the district court’s order 
granting Daily’s motion to suppress and the district court’s order denying the state’s 
motion for reconsideration, and to remand for further proceedings. 




      /s/ Mark W. Olson__________________ 
      MARK W. OLSON 
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